The Political Imaginary of Global Capitalism more

THE POLITICAL IMAGINARY OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM The Political Imaginary of Global Capitalism Ingerid S. Straume Why are there no serious alternatives to the capitalist economic system today?1 Since capitalism2 as an economic system produces many undesirable ‘externalities’ that should – rationally speaking – undermine its claim to dominance, its ‘sheer success’ is hardly a sufficient explanation. The lack of alternatives to capitalism seems to be a problem belonging not to the economic, but to the political sphere – for even though many Westerners are intensely critical of their societies’ central institutions today, few serious efforts are being made to create new ones. To account for the tremendous resilience of capitalism, therefore, one should look to its ‘political imaginary,’ rather than its ‘rational outcomes.’ This imaginary, I shall argue, represents a general depoliticization, where the social imaginary significations3 of contemporary global capitalism are up1. Many thanks to Chris Saunders, Asgeir Olden, Stephen Dobson and Bent Sofus Tranøy for useful comments and support at various stages. 2. The term ‘capitalism’ is used in accordance with Cornelius Castoriadis to denote the “ongoing transformation of the process of production in order to increase output while reducing costs.” (“The ‘Rationality’ of Capitalism,” id. Figures of the Thinkable, translated by Helen Arnold, Stanford CA, Stanford University press 2007, 53. Hereafter, FT). 3. Castoriadis’s concept ‘social imaginary significations’ refers to the dimension of instituted meaning that infuses and holds every society together. The social imaginary significations of a society are embodied its institutions (in the broadest sense of the term). The notion is influenced by Max Weber’s analyses of social institutions, but has more profound implications. 27 INGERID S. STRAUME held by a collective detachment from the political sphere. To highlight these significations and the meaning they embody, lines will be drawn and arguments constructed across different fields of inquiry such as political philosophy, economic theory, and cultural sociology. These broad, sweeping analyses necessarily lead to the loss of details and nuances. As a case in point, to argue that depoliticization represents a crisis in Western societies’ capability to create and reform themselves politically, I will consider the sphere of conscious social self-reproduction, education.4 Let us begin, however, with a closer look at the significations and workings of capitalism itself. Promises of Global Capitalism Do you want to do something for your country? Then shop! George Walker Bush, President of the United States of America, 2001 In the last few months of 2001, the economic infrastructure of the United States of America was driven to the brink of a total breakdown, as the recent terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon brought on a dramatic decline in shopping. The then Mayor of New York, Rudi Giuliani, and the President of the United States, George W. Bush, both addressed the people with a plea to save their country – by shopping as usual. Then again, in October 2008, when the global financial crisis was brought on by the collapse of the US credit market, a similar concern arose in Western countries whose economies are fuelled by consumption. The greatest threat, one that would render all policy measures pointless, was stagnated consumption, which would mean stalled growth. In Norway, the Minister of Finance – a representative of the Norwegian Socialist Left Party – gave the following advice to citizens on how to respond to the threatening crisis: Act as usual, and above all, keep shopping! This message was delivered on national television with the smiling socialist minister carrying shopping bags. The financial crisis could have been a golden opportunity to create 4. See more in Ingerid S. Straume, “‘Learning’ and Signification in Neoliberal Governance,” in this volume. 28 THE POLITICAL IMAGINARY OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM new economic institutions, systems, and practices. Indeed, it would have seemed logical to attempt to replace global capitalism with a more stable system. The problems connected to capitalist development, like financial crises, mass unemployment, concentration of capital, resource depletion, and various environmental problems, are well known, even though scholars argue whether these problems are internal or external to the capitalist system. Neoclassical economic theory, the theory currently taught in institutions of higher education, typically considers many factors irrelevant and external to its model of ‘the economy.’ One attempt to account for – and neutralize – externalities is the policy of environmental decoupling, meaning to ‘decouple’ economic growth from environmental pressure, so that growth can take place without costs to the environment. The concept is aligned with the principles of the Brundtland Report,5 where policy makers attempt to meet the demands of environmental activists without compromising economic growth. Environmental decoupling, primarily through technological innovation and recycling, is said to create a win–win situation for the environment and the general economy, while present environmental problems are alleviated.6 An example of such technological innovation is the growing industry for carbon capture and storage (CSS) connected to fossil fuel power plants; while a financial innovation is the emissions trading system (the ‘carbon market’) of the Kyoto protocol. In any of these cases – like in the Brundtland Report – the premise of growth and expected revenue is kept intact. Carbon capture and emissions trading are merely new mechanisms in the same system; the system itself is not questioned. Since the capitalist economy depends on growth, even slower growth rates – which, of course, still represent growth – would be detrimental to many capitalist institutions, such as commercial and financial banks. To prevent capitalist investors from the continued exploitation of resources, therefore, an infinitely expanding regime of regulations would most certainly be needed. 5. The World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, United Nations, 1987. 6. See also the OECD’s Environment Programme for the 21st Century, from 2001, where indicators for decoupling are set forth. 29 INGERID S. STRAUME Whereas resource depletion is, at least technically, connected to perpetual growth, a problem like unemployment is even more inherent to the economic system. For what is ‘unemployment’ really? Certainly not lack of ‘work.’ In straight physical terms, unemployment has as little to do with lack of work as poverty with lack of food: there can be unemployment even while there is work to be done, and there can be poverty and hunger even when there is food enough to feed everyone; indeed, this is a reality. This indicates that unemployment, poverty, etc. are more or less essential factors of the capitalist system. Still – and this is the great paradox that keeps capitalism alive in the collective imaginary – the promise of capitalism is to abolish all such problems – in the long run. Through the Fata Morgana of perpetual growth and unlimited expansion, capitalism holds a promise of surplus, overabundance, in which we all can take part, when our turn eventually comes. In this respect, capitalism is a beautiful dream. Meanwhile, the inherent problems of capitalism abound. For instance, as several economists have pointed out, capitalist economies tend to enter a state of crisis at more or less regular intervals. Building on the economic theory of Joseph Schumpeter, a central factor of which is innovation, Carlota Perez and Christopher Freeman have demonstrated that the crises tend to come in cycles of about 50–60 years, through shifting “technoeconomic paradigms” in which new innovations give rise to variations in the relationship between finance capital and production capital.7 New technical innovations typically lead to expansion and development in several spheres of society, accompanied by excitement in the financial sector and increasing interest in investing. The financial sector responds to technical innovation by inventing new financial products. Perez’s and Freeman’s historical examples are connected to the cotton industry, 7. Perez and Freeman have developed these points together and individually, e.g. in The Economic Legacy of Joseph Schumpeter, edited by Horst Hanusch, Edward Elgar, London, 1998. Also, see Freeman (below) and Perez, “Technological Revolutions, Paradigm Shifts and Socio-institutional Change” in Globalization, Economic Development and Inequality: An Alternative Perspective, edited by Erik Reinert, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2004. 30 THE POLITICAL IMAGINARY OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM steam engines, steel and electrification, oil and automobiles, and microelectronics.8 At a certain point, however, the potential of each new technology to stimulate knowledge and secondary innovation is exhausted. The innovative phase then culminates in an economic crisis – creating in turn a foundation for new innovation and growth. These cycles will continue as long there is innovation in the productive sector, according to Perez.9 Since the relationship between production capital and financial capital is inherently unstable – dynamic at best – the instability cannot be totally absorbed by the political system; although it could be better regulated if these trends were taken into account. Another, classical, problem with capitalism is the unwanted effects of interest and compound interest, such as capital accumulation and lack of circulation (non-growth). Within, and parallel to the capitalist system, several attempts have been made to overcome capital accumulation, such as taxing or devaluating capital that is not circulated (demurrage).10 But if these and other weaknesses are well known to economists and policy makers alike, a determined effort to replace global (interest bearing) capitalism is not very likely; nor is there reason to expect policy makers to pursue other major economic transformations in the foreseeable future. An illuminating example is the handling of the recent financial crisis. Even if most analysts would agree that the origins and causes of the crisis are to be found within the financial sector, all the affected governments reacted by shoring up the existing financial institutions in an effort to save export rates in an ever tightening global market. Governments, whether left, center, or right, met the crisis with measures intended 8. Christopher Freeman, “Income Inequalities in Changing Techno-Economic Paradigms,” in Reinert, Globalization. 9. Carlota Perez, Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2002. 10. Consider, for example, Silvio Gesell’s alternative economic system of ‘stamped money.’ Theorists with practical alternatives, like Gesell (1862–1939), are hardly taken seriously by today’s economists, nor taught in economics departments. John Maynard Keynes, however, spoke favorably of Gesell in his major work, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money from 1936. 31 INGERID S. STRAUME to soften the fall; while keeping the basic economic institutions, from which the crisis flowed in the first place, intact. For critics of capitalism and proponents of alternative economy the crisis represented a golden opportunity – but somehow, the Zeitgeist prevented a thorough critique of the system, making Fredrick Jameson’s (alleged) words true: “It is now easier to imagine the end of the world, than the end of capitalism.”11 But the question remains: What is it – even in the face of failures and obvious problems – that makes capitalism so resilient? What is it about capitalism that makes alternative economic systems seem so unrealistic? The answer cannot be traced to a lack of alternatives – the Internet abounds with practical suggestions, alternative systems, and examples – but, rather, that the very idea of replacing capitalism appears as utterly naïve. Even to voice the idea of radically changing the economic world order makes one stand out as overly idealistic, idiosyncratic, and possibly mad; even though the idea itself is perfectly logical. In other words, the resistance to systemic change in economic policy is stronger than can be accounted for by facts. One fact that makes capitalism so robust is, of course, its extension. Replacing capitalism implies profound changes that will surely evoke some psychological resistance. But sheer size is hardly enough to explain why the notion of challenging capitalism appears almost absurd. In my view, the explanation can be found in the very strong significations embodied in capitalism’s imaginary, such as the notions of free choice, individual agency, perpetual growth, and – in the long run – prosperity for all. It is first and foremost these significations that render capitalism superior to all of its alternatives. This claim will be developed in the next section. 11. Contrary to what is often claimed, Jameson is not the father of the quote; in the essay “Future City”, New Left Review, no. 21 (May–June 2003), Jameson writes: “Someone once said that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism. We can now revise that and witness the attempt to imagine capitalism by way of imagining the end of the world.” 32 THE POLITICAL IMAGINARY OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM Independence – Control There never has been and there never will be a purely ‘functional’ society. Social imaginary significations organize the proper world of each society under consideration and furnish a ‘meaning’ to this world.12 According to Castoriadis, it is essentially the social imaginary significations that differentiate one social-historical form – a society – from another. Significations are not merely cognitive, but consist of representation(s), affect, and drive/will/intention.13 They are ‘embodied’ in society’s institutions, and as such, provide the bearings for social conduct, norms, sense and non-sense, etc. Among the most distinctive significations in contemporary Western societies are freedom and rationality. These significations are central to capitalism, in science, and in political liberalism – classical and modern.14 Accordingly, there exists a connection between these spheres – historical more than logical – which grew especially strong during the Cold War, as capitalist expansion and political liberalism was consolidated into theory by such influential thinkers as Isaiah Berlin, Raymond Aron, and Karl Popper.15 From their political-ideological works in the theory of science and political philosophy emerged a powerful, integrated notion of ‘capitalist liberalism’ as the only sane and moral world order. This idea, although rarely spelled out, was echoed again and again in political and economic theory; and historical events seemed to make it true. Even the term ‘democracy’ was for a long time seen as a property of the Western liberal-capitalist regimes, where capitalism’s institutions were treated as necessary conditions for a 12. Cornelius Castoriadis, “Psychoanalysis and Philosophy,” id., The Castoriadis Reader, edited and translated by David Ames Curtis, Oxford, Blackwell, 1997, 358. Hereafter, CR. 13. CR, 353. 14. As elaborated by Peter Wagner, Modernity as Interpretation and Experience, Cambridge, Polity, 2008. 15. See Jan-Werner Müller’s paper, “Fear and Freedom: On Cold War Liberalism,” http://www.princeton.edu/~jmueller/ColdWarLiberalism-JWMueller-2006.pdf. 33 INGERID S. STRAUME viable democracy.16 Within the ideology of ‘Cold War liberalism,’17 and its continued impulses within neoliberalism, the historical facts of the Second World War, the Cold War, and the crumbling of the Eastern Communist regimes became instruments to strengthen the position of capitalism. In the last decades of the 20th century, history, notably totalitarianism, was taken as proof of the desirability – indeed, necessity – of a polity based on market capitalism and a relatively weak, regulatory state. As a consequence, it became increasingly more difficult to articulate alternative theories to political liberalism.18 In his sociological-historical analysis of modernity in Europe and the USA, Peter Wagner claims that in the US version – due to a lack of common political-moral justification – ‘modernity’ became “theoretically extreme” in terms of “individualism and instrumentalism.” This alleged poverty of political thought brought forth what Wagner calls a “rationalistic-individualistic interpretation of modernity” that gave rise to the dominant form of capitalism as we know it today.19 The close association of individual-based, political liberalism with capitalism is supported by an extremely simple political and social ontology. Its theoretical elements – setting the stage for socio-political considerations – consist of individuals in relationship to things: ‘man vis-à-vis objects’. These objects can be anything from physical objects to elements in a model world; such as ‘goods,’ ‘interests,’ and ‘the global market.’ In this scenario, the relevant theoretical subject-type is the agent; a prototype that did not exist prior to social science. It is also possible to identify 16. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were, especially during the 1980s and 90s, involved in structural adjustment programs whose impact on domestic policy in developing countries in many ways represented a continuation of Cold War politics against ‘socialism.’ 17. Müller, “Fear and Freedom.” 18. For a long time, left-leaning political theorists and radical democrats were routinely accused of (at least theoretically, or secretly) supporting totalitarianism, even genocide – from Gulag to Cambodia. In light of the recent, failed “crusade” for freedom and democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan, these inferences have lost much of their force. 19. Modernity, 113–14. 34 THE POLITICAL IMAGINARY OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM an ideal relationship between the agent and things, characterized by freedom – or control – wherein the agent-subject should be independent, not dependent. Insofar as ‘man’ is able to choose between, control and manipulate objects, he is seen to be free. This ideal takes an explicit form in political liberalism, and is implicit in economic liberalism and science. The essence of freedom, then, means to be in control of, or unaffected by, one’s environment. Such freedom is attainable through rational means: By patiently developing his technoscience, ‘man’ could become master of nature. Hence, through the notion of a free market the economic sphere could become a model of freedom, rather than a sphere of dependence, as Hegel thought.20 The striving for mastery of the world of objects (i.e., agency) is characteristic of that tendency in the natural and social sciences that Charles Taylor labels ‘naturalism.’21 Naturalism, like free market ideology, is really about the agent: [B]ehind and supporting the impetus to naturalism […], viz. the understandable prestige of the natural science model, stands an attachment to a certain picture of the agent. This picture is deeply attractive to moderns, both flattering and inspiring. It shows us as capable of achieving a kind of disengagement from our world by objectifying it.22 According to Taylor, this objectification of the world builds on a much deeper, metaphysical notion, viz. the myth of the disengaged self, which holds a certain status of freedom, dignity and power.23 Because of its desirability, the impetus to naturalism is strong even in disciplines where the natural science model and ‘the spectator’s theory of knowledge’ (Dewey) are less than adequate. The myth of the disengaged self also has a societal aspect: 20. Georg W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1817]. 21. Charles Taylor, Philosophical Papers, Volume I. Human Agency and Language, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985. Herafter, PP1. 22. PP1, 4. 23. PP1, 6. 35 INGERID S. STRAUME The ideal of disengagement defines a certain – typically modern – notion of freedom, as the ability to act on one’s own, without outside interference or subordination to outside authority. It defines its own peculiar notion of human dignity, closely connected to freedom. And these in turn are linked to ideals of efficacy, power, unperturbability, which for all their links with earlier ideals are original with modern culture.24 The pleasure acquired from viewing oneself as free, disengaged, and dignified, Taylor claims, makes these – distinctly modern – theories resilient to critique. They offer flattering, yet unrealistic ideas of the nature and conditions of the human being, especially in terms of agency. Theories that conceive of individuals as able to construct their own meaning, choose their own values, etc. are, of course, much more enjoyable as interpretative repertoires than sociologically orientated theories that place emphasis on structural power and collective meaning making, not to mention false consciousness and repression. Taylor sees disengagement as a distinctly modern ideal. Nevertheless, as Johann Pàll Arnason, Peter Wagner, and others have argued, modernity is not one, but many.25 This becomes clear when modernity is theorized in terms of significations that lend themselves to multiple formations and interpretations. Inspired by Cornelius Castoriadis, Arnason’s and Wagner’s analyses of modernity are orientated around the ‘double signification’ of autonomy and rational mastery. Running deep through modern societies, these ‘core significations’ constitute these societies’ notions of power, critique, thinking, meaning making, socialization, etc. Autonomy and rational mastery are mutually irreducible to, and in persistent tension with, each other. They are embodied in institutions at various levels, including the economy, politics, and in epistemes such as science. In Castoriadis’s analysis, the prime embodiment of “the project 24. PP1, 5. 25. See Johann Pàll Arnason, “The Imaginary Constitution of Modernity” in Autonomie et autotransformation de la société. La philosophie militante de Cornelius Castoriadis, edited by Giovanni Busino, Genéve, Libraire Droz, 1989; and Wagner, Modernity. 36 THE POLITICAL IMAGINARY OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM of autonomy” is democracy, whereas the embodiment of the “unlimited expansion of rational mastery” is capitalism.26 This means that capitalism, as the embodiment of a core signification, cannot simply be ‘seen through’ and ‘discarded’ without threatening the very foundations of Western modernity. To Castoriadis, all the central, modern institutions are orientated around the expansion of such rational (or “pseudo-rational”) mastery: The presentation of science and of technique as neutral means or as instruments pure and simple is not a mere ‘illusion’: it is an integral part of the contemporary institution of society – that is, it partakes of the dominant social imaginary of our age. This dominant social imaginary can be encapsulated in one sentence: The central aim of social life is the unlimited expansion of rational mastery.27 According to this scenario, capitalism is much more than an economic system; it is also a social regime, and as such, an embodiment of social imaginary significations that orient societies in a very deep sense. The limitless expansion of rational mastery concerns mastery of matter, but also of the mind, e.g., through socialization. In Castoriadis’s words: [T]he tendency toward ‘rationality’ reorganizing and reconstructing all spheres of social life – production, administration, education, culture, etc. – transforms the whole institution of society and penetrates ever further into all activities.28 Against this background, the main reason for capitalism’s success should be sought in its powerful representations of freedom and independence, although it perhaps could better be characterized as expansion and control, following the aforementioned discussions by Castoriadis and Wagner. And as previously mentioned, one reason why capitalism is seen as 26. “From Ecology to Autonomy,” CR, 239–52. 27. CR, 240. 28. CR, 240. 37 INGERID S. STRAUME the only realistic economic system today is partly because of its alleged ‘rationality,’ and partly because it is so hard to believe that anyone could actually replace it. Put differently, so much psychological energy and faith is invested in capitalism that it just seems ‘natural.’ However, in its early days, capitalism did not appear natural at all, as it gradually took the place of other economic practices and perspectives. It is time to take a closer look at economic theory and its history. Economic Theory and the Loss of History The leading economic theory at institutions of higher education throughout the West today is neoclassical theory (or microeconomics). By providing a theoretical stage for notions such as the (ideally independent) agent, control, and expanding rational mastery,29 neoclassical theory provides theoretical support for market capitalism. Its present dominance in higher education parallels a decline of economic history in the curricula; as economist Erik Reinert argues, the theory holds hegemony, in spite of its apparent weaknesses, by denying historicity.30 Neoclassical theory is basically model-based, with little or no need for history, practical insights, or contextual modifications. Instead of context and history, neoclassical theory rests on metaphors, models, and mathematics. I will address each of these aspects in the following. The widespread dependence on metaphors is a rather obvious weakness, shared by several economic theories.31 Metaphors can be imported from various domains of life, such as the living organism, sports, or in the case of neoclassical theory, physics. In early neoclassical theory, metaphors were taken from thermodynamics and the behavior of gases under pressure, as 29. In his later texts, Castoriadis would say “pseudo-rational pseudo-mastery.” 30. Erik Reinert, Spontant kaos. Økonomi i en ulvetid, Oslo, Res Publica, 2009 (SR); Reinert, How Rich Countries Got Rich ... and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor, London, Constable, 2007 (HR); see also Cornelius Castoriadis, “The ‘Rationality’ of Capitalism”, FT, 47–70. 31. See, e.g., the works of Deirdre McCloskey. See also Berit Von der Lippe, ”Metaforer i økonomisk språkbruk,” in Retorikk, samfunn og samtid, edited by Odd Nordhaug and Hans-Ivar Christiansen, Oslo, Forlag 1, 2007. 38 THE POLITICAL IMAGINARY OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM shown in expressions such as over-heated economy, inflation/deflation, pressure, liquidity and more specifically, market entropy. Underlying these well-established expressions is the mother of all neoclassical metaphors: equilibrium, i.e., the fundamental principle of thermodynamics. From the central, organizing metaphor of equilibrium a giant equation is projected, of economic variables rising and falling, producing pressure and heat, all of which conform to internal economic ‘laws.’ Even though the notion of equilibrium itself is unfounded in empirical economy, the set of metaphors is well suited to the ideology of the ‘perfect market.’ Equilibrium is also necessary to found models based on mathematical equations. Castoriadis notes that: The obsession with balance has two roots, both ideological. Positions of equilibrium are chosen because they are the only ones in which precise, univocal solutions are possible: systems of simultaneous equations provide a disguise of scientific exactness. Second, equilibriums are almost always presented as equivalent to situations of ‘optimization’ (‘cleared’ markets, fully employed factors, consumers achieving maximum satisfaction, and so forth).32 The metaphor of equilibrium highlights the contingency of mathematical models, which is discussed below. But first, a few words on the historical background for the present situation. Along with the formation of the modern nation-states in Europe during the seventeenth century, political economy developed as one of the central savoirs for ‘handling people and things,’ as Foucault would put it.33 The separation between economic theory and political philosophy, however, is more recent. In the eighteenth century, when the classical English liberalists John Stuart Mill and Adam Smith were discussing the distribution of wealth and the allocation of political rights, economic 32. FT, 61. 33. Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in The Foucault Effect, edited by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991. 39 INGERID S. STRAUME theory and political philosophy went hand in hand. Economic theories were still drawing on historical experience, and aligned with contextual factors concerning production and the market. In other words, economic activity was seen as different in different parts of the world, and not subject to standardization. Economic liberalism, the school of thought founded by Adam Smith, was instrumental in doing away with these insights; by concentrating on the exchange function of the economy, where both trade and production were theorized as ‘labor,’ Smith’s theory eliminated the context of the production.34 David Ricardo took this reductionism a step further in his classical 1817 work on trade, labor, and value in which he expounded his theory of ‘comparative advantage.’35 Trade (or exchange) will benefit all parties, he proposed, even if one of them (e.g., a resource-rich country or a highly-skilled artisan) is more productive in every possible area than the trading counterpart (e.g., a resource-poor country or an unskilled laborer), as long as each party concentrates on the activities in which it has a relative productivity advantage. The theory argues against every kind of protection of domestic trade and industry, as countries are advised to specialize at whatever developmental stage they happen to find themselves – regardless of how they got there. So while a highly industrialized nation, like Great Britain, should specialize in advanced industry, a nation with very little technology should specialize in delivering raw materials. The theory disregards the historical fact that all industrialized nations built their industrial technology and infrastructure with the aid of trade restrictions, customs barriers, etc.36 When poor nations whose economies were based on raw materials and agriculture were denied the possibility to develop their own industry and infrastructure, they were forced to compete with industrialized nations whose infrastructure was built up during a period of strict protectionism. Under the postulate of ‘comparative advantage’ and ‘free market,’ poor 34. Reinert, SK, HR. 35. David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817). 36. The theory was very beneficial to the colonial powers, justifying England’s industrial superiority, and Ricardo himself was able to build a substantial fortune. 40 THE POLITICAL IMAGINARY OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM countries can only “specialize in poverty,” says Reinert.37 Ricardo, and Smith before him, created abstract economic theories that ignored context and history. Today, such ‘model theories’ of the economy are almost universally accepted by university departments.38 The models of neoclassical theory build on the notion of input and output, where all factors are seen as computable, and therefore, in principle, comparable. As already indicated, this presupposition is clearly false – though this statement is not particularly controversial: anyone studying economics learns that theoretical models of the economy do not ‘work,’ i.e., they cannot really help us predict the future. Even so, it is hard to see any other reasons for the widespread use of mathematics in neoclassical economic theory than a striving for exactness in prediction.39 The depiction of the economy as a model creates at least two illusions: First, that economic reality can only be properly understood by experts, and second, that economic reality is rational, that is, understandable and computable in principle, provided adequate information is available on all relevant factors.40 The connection between the physics metaphors, the model-image, and the dependence on mathematics now becomes obvious, as the image of economy as a model whose natural/optimal state is equilibrium facilitates – and from a methodological viewpoint, necessitates – mathematical computability. If such computability is unachievable, however, the model-image itself would be inappropriate. The first question needing investigation, then, is whether the different economic factors are really comparable and arithmetically calculable. For instance, are labor and production amenable to arithmetic computation? Castoriadis and Reinert are unanimously dismissive, claiming that the ‘arithmetic factors’ of economic theories are 37. Erik Reinert, HR. 38. HR. 39. See for instance Don Ross, Economic Theory and Cognitive Science: Microexplanation, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2005 (ETCS). 40. Cf. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spiral of Capitalism, London, Unwin University Books, 1968. Castoriadis (FT) explains why such a total ‘rationalization’ can never be achieved. 41 INGERID S. STRAUME arbitrary, often practically indistinguishable, and heterogeneous. Using numerous examples, Castoriadis discredits the theoretical postulates of separability and separate imputation. Here is an example concerning the computation of economic results: The imputation of an economic result to any one firm is purely conventional and arbitrary: it follows boundaries set by law (private property), conventions, and habits. It is no less arbitrary to ascribe a productive result to any one factor of production, be it ‘capital’ or labor’. Capital (in the sense of the means of production produced) and labor contribute to the productive result without any possibility of sorting out their respective contributions [...]41 In recent years, the guiding metaphors of economic theory have shifted from thermodynamics to systems theories, whose models and metaphors involve artificial intelligence (AI), simulation models, cognitive science, evolutionary theory, and behavioral science.42 Keeping the principle of computation intact, contemporary economic theories are concerned with the optimization of something or other.43 The theorists concentrate on systems – models of computation – whose goal is prediction. Philip Mirowski, a historian of economy, calls this a theory tradition closed in on itself – the “Grand Theory of Everything,” where all is computed.44 As Don Ross points out, following Mirowski, the simulation approach does indeed produce results, but with diminishing returns: “simulation makes things happen, but it becomes unclear how to characterize what is happening or why.”45 AI-simulation, for example, seeks to find the basis for behavioral patterns in the internal dynamics of modular parts of the simulated system itself. Whether the phenomenon under exploration is 41. Castoriadis, FT, 57. 42. Philip Mirowski, Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science..Cambridge University Press, 2002 (MD). 43. Ross, ETCS. 44. Ross, ETCS, 11–12, Mirowski, MD, 533–34. 45. ETCS, 11. 42 THE POLITICAL IMAGINARY OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM an individual’s internal organization (rational agency), or dissolution of the self into ‘rational systems theory,’ the theoretical building blocks are still computation and algorithmic mathematical modeling.46 These brief considerations of neoclassical theory and its fundamental assumptions should give an indication of why the status of the capitalist economic system can remain almost unchallenged by leading economic theorists. The ideological power of theory is central: When (theoretical) form is given priority over (practical) relevance, an illusion is created that the economy can be understood by obtaining insight into theories – eliciting the notion of control via calculation (i.e., rational mastery). The central notion of computability is still closely related to Ricardo’s principles of abstract production and context-free goods. But the use of mathematical operations presupposes a homogeneity and factor stability over time that simply does not exist in a real market, nor in a national economy; requirements that become acute when it comes to the use of complex mathematical operations like the differential calculus and functions.47 But, as Amartya Sen has pointed out, most economists prefer to be exactly wrong, than to be approximately right.48 Thinking Inside the Matrix Let us try to imagine an economic theory whose principle is de-growth, lessened consumption, production, transportation, and which, above all, is based on leaving all earth’s remaining minerals in the ground – forever. In the light of the current economic doctrine, such ideas are plainly absurd. In light of resource ecology and planetary sustainability, it is perfectly logical. As this thought experiment shows, it is very hard, if not impossible, to think wholly ‘outside capitalism.’ The significations of capitalism – instrumentalism, consumerism, rational control, computation, etc. – are deeply rooted in the social world, and therefore in the socialized psyche of all individuals in capitalist societies. To think under global 46. ETCS, 11. 47. Castoriadis, FT, 61. 48. Erik Reinert, Global Økonomi, hvordan de rike ble rike og hvorfor fattige blir fattigere, Oslo, Spartacus, 2004, 23. 43 INGERID S. STRAUME capitalism, then, means to think ‘inside the matrix’ where these ideas and significations are embodied. This does not mean that in modern societies everything is subject to rational control, far from it; but, as seen by Max Weber, the idea that if we wished, we could learn how to control all things.49 Increasing intellectualization and rationalization, therefore, does not signify “an increased and greater generalized knowledge of the conditions under which one lives” – in this respect, Weber considered the savage to be at least as knowledgeable – but rather: … the knowledge or belief that if one but wished one could learn it at any time. Hence, it means that principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted. One need no longer have recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed. Technical means and calculations perform the service.50 Inside the capitalist matrix, learning how things work is thought to be achievable in principle, e.g., by means of modern science and/or calculation. It should therefore be possible to understand, and through this, control, all objects – if not in practice then at least in theory. For those who are in the position to make the necessary effort mastery and control is within reach – if not in the short run, then certainly in the long run. Rational investigation – which Castoriadis calls ‘positing and assembling’ – makes control possible. By contrast, the world before rationalization was seen to be ruled by, or ridden with, forces that were mystical and inexplicable to man. Hence, ‘man’ was easily humbled and scared.51 To be in control, then, means to be free of concerns caused by insecurity, 49. The ”Entzauberung der Welt,” see Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” id, Essays in Sociology, translated and edited by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, New York, Oxford University Press, 1946,129–56 http://www.leonardbeeghley.com/docs/ SYG%206125/Weber,%Science%20as20a%%20Vocation.pdf (ScV). 50. ScV. 51. ScV. 44 THE POLITICAL IMAGINARY OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM humility, and mystery. In short, rationalization is the systematic denial of human mortality – and also the elimination of politics, in the special sense of the term cast by philosopher Hannah Arendt. At this point, we encounter one of the many intersections between the dominant capitalist imaginary and the imaginary significations of politics, where the latter is threatened by the former.52 In the remaining part of this article, I will concentrate on this tendency towards depoliticization. One of the few thinkers to thoroughly analyze and conceptualize depoliticization is Hannah Arendt.53 In her analysis, the totalitarian regimes that gave birth to Gulag and Holocaust were characterized by, and effectuated through, the destruction of politics, as individuals were pitted against each other in an atomized totality where everybody monitored everyone else, thus, destroying what Arendt calls our common world.54 The emotional climate of totalitarianism was – and is – tempered by fear and distrust, indecision and unpredictability. Today, it could be argued that politics – and ‘thinking’ in Arendt’s emphatic sense – are once again in a precarious state, as individuals are lined up against each other as competitors and consumers, where fear is a driving force: “shop, or else ... ”, and the logic of competition is extended to more and more domains in life. Still, when consumption is concerned, it is likely that most people consume with a certain ambivalence, since most of us know that consumption – the consumption by some – will be the ruin of us all in the long run. I will elaborate the psychological implications of this claim in the final section of my essay, drawing a diagnosis of a society in crisis – a crisis of political creation – using education as a heuristic. 52. The depoliticizing effects – if not the theoretical principles themselves – are paralleled by those of Habermas’ colonization thesis, where the ‘life world,’ whose organizing principle is communicative rationality is threatened by the ‘system,’ driven by instrumental rationality. Jürgen Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, two volumes, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1981. 53. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago, University of Chicago press 1989 [1958] (HC); Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York, Shocken 2004 [1951] (OT). 54. OT. 45 INGERID S. STRAUME Political Creation in Crisis The free, rational agent of political liberalism and market capitalism has been thoroughly criticized for its reductionism, abstractness, anomy, and more55 – and in practical reality, this figure is far from rational. Cornelius Castoriadis claims that ‘man,’ under global capitalism, is rather the opposite: “Man is [...] like a child who finds himself in a house with chocolate walls, and who sets out to eat them without understanding that the rest of the house is soon going to fall on his head.”56 Somewhere in the collective imaginary, there is probably a fairly acute sense of the true state of the construction: No person raised and educated in a modern democracy can be totally ignorant of the planet’s limited resources, nor of the interdependence between resource levels, policies of growth, industrial production, and the inflated level of consumption in capitalist societies. The problem is not so much to imagine the disasters ahead, but rather to believe in the possibility of change, as I have argued in the opening sections of this essay. To further the analysis, I now turn to my case in point, education. The following is based on the premise that political creation draws on the capacity to visualize that society could have been different, since society, with its norms, values, and institutions, is a social creation. To account for this premise, Cornelius Castoriadis distinguishes between what he calls the ‘instituting’ and the ‘instituted’ society. The instituting society is society’s capacity for self-creation; it is society’s capacity to create itself as a certain social ‘form.’ The instituted society is the created, i.e., the product of the instituting society, consisting of laws, norms, and institutions in which significations are embodied. Society is self-creation. ’That which’ creates society and history is the instituting society, as opposed to the instituted society. The instituting society is the social imaginary in the radical sense. The self-institution of society is the creation of a human world: of ‘things,’ ‘reality,’ language, 55. Zygmunt Bauman, Cornelius Castoriadis, Alisdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, Arne Johan Vetlesen and many others. 56. FT, 145. 46 THE POLITICAL IMAGINARY OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM norms, values, ways of life and death, objects for which we live and objects for which we die – and of course, first and foremost, the creation of the human individual in which the institution of society is massively embedded.57 In order to change the existing institutions (the instituted) and create new social imaginary significations, it is necessary to realize that things could be otherwise. If this insight is not properly instituted, however, society will see itself as a product of forces outside its own control. The instituting society remains unacknowledged, and the instituted society is not conceived as created by society itself. For instance, capitalism could be conceived as a law-like force to which the social world is subject – one that can only be followed and cannot questioned in any profound sense. In the sociological tradition from Max Weber, this ‘deep questioning’ – i.e., political-philosophical questioning – is seen as a defining characteristic of the project of modernity itself. In modernity, the existing (traditional) social values are no longer seen as valid per definition, something which has deep implications for conscious social reproduction, and therefore, education. At least since Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, the critique of culture and civilization is constitutive of the project of modernity, and a premise of theories and practices of education. A striking example is the ‘critical education,’ taught in Nordic schools in the 1970s and 80s as a deliberate counter influence to mass culture.58 In the following, I will argue that this self-critique has now started to turn back on itself, where critique threatens to turn into cultural self-contempt. This becomes quite clear if we analyze the typical relationship between parents and children in contemporary global capitalism in light of the previously developed sections of this paper. Together with the rise of ‘critical consciousness’ in Western societies, at least since ‘1968,’ many parents have found themselves in a social and 57. Cornelius Castoriadis, Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy, translated and edited by David Ames Curtis, New York Oxford, Oxford University press, 1991, 84. 58. Cf, e.g., the Norwegian book title The School as Counter-Culture (Alfred O. Telhaug, Skolen som motkultur, Oslo, Cappelen, 1987). 47 INGERID S. STRAUME natural setting that they sometimes find undesirable, even disturbing and harmful. For example, the natural surroundings and countryside, which until today have been very important in the socialization of Norwegian children,59 are no longer representations of pure or clean nature. Things in the countryside, in woods, and water, are now potentially harmful in an ‘unnatural’ way. This transformation happened in just a few years. The shocking implication is, of course, that human beings are the agents of this destruction – humanity is undermining its own existence. From this fact comes the notion of humanity as inherently harmful. And while we cognitively and technically appear to have the capacity, we still seem unable to stop the destruction of the natural environment. The situation is inherently ‘pathological.’ Now, if and when these ideas enter the field of education via literature, educational programs, etc. the pathology is affirmed and consolidated. In the Nordic countries, for example, children’s literature has tended for some time to thematize adulthood, and especially the shortcomings of adults in political and environmental matters. Books and TV-programs illustrate how ‘silly’ grown-ups are: always in a hurry and through their grown-up-actions ruining the environment. The authors often try to form an alliance with the children against ‘the grown-ups.’60 But since the world of grown-ups is the only resource for the child in the process of becoming an adult self, the subject-position offered to the child in this literature is very problematic. Systematically denigrating adults and adult behavior is detrimental to the child’s opportunities for identification, as there are no other ideals available. The child is forced to identify with ambivalence or nothing at all. My main point is that the conflict between adults and children portrayed by this literature points to a deeper conflict, between the culture and the individual – or rather, within the culture itself – where the central imaginary significations that organize Western societies, no longer offer sufficient meaning for its members. And since capitalism’s significations 59. My comments are based on experiences from living in Norway. 60. These observations are based on literature studies from Norway, especially from the 1990s. 48 THE POLITICAL IMAGINARY OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM – such as rational mastery, consumerism, and instrumentalism – still provide the compass points for our practical orientation as a collective, the situation is deeply ‘schizophrenic.’ It represents a form of alienation, a split within society’s self-image, where the relationship between the instituting and the instituted society is distorted. As Slavoj Žižek has pointed out, we detest it, and we don’t believe in it, but we still perform and live it.61 The split runs deep, arising within modern society itself, and there is no (rational) escape. This was tragically demonstrated by the Norwegian socialist minister of finance, who probably felt obliged to pose for the photographer holding shopping bags. Still, the adult world is the only available template onto which the child’s aspiration to grow up can be projected. If this world is discredited, the child is left without the cultural resources necessary to build a self. This is the problem that Hannah Arendt addressed in her controversial essay The Crisis in Education, claiming that: “Anyone who refuses to have joint responsibility for the world should not have children and must not be allowed to take part in educating them.”62 In Arendt’s view, adults have a duty to hand over an ‘intact world’ to the next generation – even when they (the adults) wish to change this world, and wish it were otherwise. Practices of education that ignore, or are unable to follow this principle, are in a state of crisis. Now, while the crisis I have described here is a socio-cultural one, its manifestations – as always – affect people individually and in relation to one another. For instance, children in capitalist societies express in their wishes and actions the demands of a consumer culture – a culture of which many parents are critical. In other words, the consumption-oriented, seemingly selfish attitudes of the young are, to a large extent, attitudes derived from and reflective of the consumer culture at large – played out as conflicts in the home. Hence, the parent or educator is forced to wrestle with problems far beyond the sphere of the personal and educational, such as consumerism, instrumentalism, reification, and cynicism. The 61. Slavoj Žižek has elaborated these points in many of his works. 62. Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future. Eight Exercises in Political Thought, New York, Penguin, 1977 [1961], 189. 49 INGERID S. STRAUME scene is set for individuals to resist their own culture; a fight they can never ‘win.’ Ambivalence and collective self-contempt takes the stage. Depoliticization, as we have seen, rests on the inability of existing institutions to provide sufficiently robust meaning to act as resources for addressing the political problems of the society in question. Put differently: when a society is not able to justify its own significations, it is alienated from itself and its own creative capacity. Under these circumstances, social reproduction becomes very problematic. The instituting society has given birth to a monster – here, the institution of capitalism – and is paralyzed by it. The deepest effect of depoliticization, therefore, is society’s abdication of its own creative capacity, which, as I have argued, also implies cultural and personal suffering. 50